Name:
E-mail:
Employed as: Conductor, for 10-20 years
Posted: 16 May 2009
Here is a post from another board, not saying this is what happened but
i am more inclined to believe this than anything that comes from the
carriers or ntsb/fra reports:
This is not going to be short, but it should cover the topic that the
media and CSX have ignored.
The track where the fatality occurred was filled with garbage cars
carrying solid waste. What one has to understand is that these cars, by
nature, are a trainman's worst nightmare when switching and coupling is
involved. They are long freight cars, as opposed to your standard
boxcar. They usually smell bad. They are often dripping waste and after
a heavy rain, stormwater collects and sloshes from them. The drawbars,
the part that the couplers are attached to, are very long and move
laterally to the point that they often need to be straightened out,
which involves getting between the cars. The knuckles do not always
match up and they can cross rather easily. It is not uncommon for them
to have extensive hump damage. For this reason, Conrail used to shove
them the hump over in solid blocks, or not hump them at all. Not so
with CSX.
At any rate the rumor mill is at full speed in Selkirk.
It has been less than one year since these remotes were implemented in
the class yard in Selkirk. Jared was killed less than three weeks
before his 9th anniversary on the railroad with CSX. Jared was not the
kind of employee you would expect to get coupled to death between
freight cars. He was not one of those guys that I would consider a
cowboy. He did not recklessly fly around all over the place, running
for a quit. He used air on the cars, as required. He climbed on and off
equipment properly using the grab irons and platforms. He did not get on
and off moving equipment. He performed all required tests and did not
cut any corners. If ordered to, he would not attach his signature to an
inspection sheet for the calendar day inspection on his locomotive
without performing all the required tests and inspections. He would not
sign off on a defective locomotive. He wanted to get the work done, but
he wanted to go home to his family at the end of the day.
There are rumors flying around all over the place. One rumor is that
another conductor was told to replace the knuckle a week ago Friday on
May 8th. He was emphatic and said no. So the powers-to-be waited until
they had an opportunity to order someone like Jared who was less likely
to make a stink about it. The best rumor yet is that the NTSB went
looking for the tapes of the radio transmissions on that day, Sunday,
May 10th Mothers Day, and that CSX does not have any record of them. Or
that they were so CONVENIENTLY lost or destroyed.
Everyone wants to get the FRA involved, but as far as I am concerned,
they are a part of the problem, not the solution. Ironically, Jared was
involved in a situation a few weeks ago in which the FRA helped seal the
nail on his coffin. We had an incident in April where a utility trainman
assisted Jared with a car that had defective brake rigging hanging off
one end the car. The rigging needed to be removed as the car was unsafe
to move the way it was. The car department was dispatched and arrived on
the scene with a cutting torch. The utility trainman had a briefing with
the car department, and they agreed to let him use the torch on the car,
so that Jared could move it safely without damaging any tracks or
equipment. Whether you agree with this or not, and I do not personally,
as I feel it is crossing crafts, this is what was done. The FRA just so
happened to be on site at the time, unbeknownst to Jared and the
utility man and the car department, and they took exception to a
utility man crossing crafts, and also fouling equipment. Since that
day, utility trainmen have not been allowed to assist in any way that
involves fouling equipment, which would include changing a knuckle.
So as far as I am concerned the FRA is useless in getting involved.
They are no better than the carrier who implemented the remotes to
begin with. The FRA knows that the remotes are not as productive and
safe as having a qualified locomotive engineer on the head end. They go
so far as to review remote operations and use the excuse that since the
technology is still new, the operations will be revisited and reviewed.
The FRA gives "guidelines" and "suggestions" such as not riding
freight cars and hanging off moving equipment with the RCO box, but
stops short of actually making implementation mandatory by the
carriers. Instead, the FRA leaves it up to the remote control
operator's "discretion." They may as well be in bed with the
carriers.
Then you have the corporate spin doctors. Clueless lackeys like CSX
spokesperson Bob Sullivan who claims "no action is ever taken without
safety being the first and foremost priority." They seem programmed to
say this stuff. This is almost laughable because what it really comes
down to is money and not safety on the part of CSX. They have
eliminated a locomotive engineer on each yard job, saving thousands
over the course of the day in a big class yard like Selkirk or
Waycross. CSX's corporate attitude is seemingly: So we have a fatality
or major injury once in awhile? The remotes pay for themselves over the
course of time!
The remotes DO work. To say that they do not would be fallacy. However,
what they do NOT do is work WELL. At best, they work with a fair degree
of mediocrity when used on the hump. In the class yard? Forget it.
Maybe 50% to 60% as effective as having a locomotive engineer on the
job.
By their very use, a remote control box adds the additional duties once
held by a locomotive engineer and gives them to the trainman on the
ground. The railroad has set up "zones" where each locomotive and
operator works exclusively so as to avoid having to have a man on the
head end or in the locomotive. The locomotive is set up with GPS to
communicate with electronic transmitters (or "pucks" for those of us
in the know) placed strategically on the tracks to stop it before it
leaves the yard, and to regulate the distance it can go while
switching.
What remotes do NOT do is respond to the controls and control a
locomotive as safely and effectively as a qualified and certified
locomotive engineer. And no matter what the carrier says with their
smoke-and-mirrors show, there is simply no substitute for having a
qualified locomotive engineer in the cab of that engine to control it
and prevent it from moving.
How many times do we remote control operators have to select a
direction (forward/reverse), hit the vigilance button and select the
speed/throttle position only to get a "speed selector pressed without
vigilance button" error message? This error message (which indicates
that you have failed to hit the vigilance button prior to selecting a
speed) comes up countless times in the course of the shift when you
actually HAVE done it properly, stranding you for several seconds each
time it happens, further slowing down productivity. How many times does
the box get knocked into neutral while riding cars, immediately stopping
the movement? Or you inadvertently lean on the power button while riding
a car, effectively turning off the box, stopping the movement,
completely unplanned? How about thinking, "Wow, this seems a bit
fast," and you look down and see that the speed you had it in, like 7
mph, has been accidentally knocked up to 10 mph, or God-forbid, 15
mph.
Never mind the fact that changing a knuckle should be performed by a
car inspector when they are available and on-duty at the same supply
point. In fact, as mentioned, it was the geniuses at the FRA who
decided that utility trainmen - despite the fact that they can attach
themselves to a crew to assist, even so far as taking over the remote
control box - could NOT foul equipment in order to assist in changing
knuckles. Instead, the FRA mandated that responsibility (fouling
equipment, changing knuckles) belonged solely to the remote conductor
and not another member of the crew. It was also the geniuses at the FRA
who declared that removing the vest with the box, or turning off the box
was a de-certifiable offense. Unfortunately, I will tell you from
personal experience that the assistance of a utility trainman and
setting the handbrake on the engine and then dumping it (initiating an
emergency brake application) and turning off the box, "short-terming"
the engine and taking off the vest is BY FAR THE SAFEST WAY TO CHANGE
OUT A KNUCKLE WHEN ORDERED TO DO SO. But it is ILLEGAL. This is a
failure on which the burden can be equally shared by CSX and its
operating rules department and also the FRA. Both parties should know
better.
That a fatality should have arisen from this is absurd. That a company
officer with minimal railroad and operating experience would order a
seasoned employee who asked not once, but twice for assistance, to do
something this grievous when there were mechanical forces on-duty is
unacceptable.
For those of us who have changed 75 pound knuckles before, we all know
what a challenge it can be - even with two people. Alone is even
harder. Now try doing it wearing the box.
For those of you that have never been up close and seen remote control
operations, it is something else.
The "operator" or whatever you want to call the person at the
controls, has a vest, belt, or harness around his/her shoulders and/or
waist with an eight pound remote control box the size of a shoebox
attached to your belly or groin area. Changing a knuckle, you want to
have your arms and torso as close to the knuckle as possible, due to
its weight and density. Wearing the box, you may as well be pregnant -
it is almost impossible to get close enough to effectively replace the
knuckle. You are like a bull in a china closet wearing that thing.
In addition to tasks like climbing on and off equipment, lacing air
hoses, setting and releasing handbrakes (both conventionally and with a
brakestick) it is fairly easy to knock controls around to the point that
you wind up doing one or more of the following:
Lean against the "vigilance toggle switch" - similar to an alerter
and also functions as one, but is also required before selecting a
speed or acknowledging and resetting a penalty brake application.
Lean against the "direction toggle switch" - forward-neutral-reverse
Hit the dial on one side resulting in various independent brake
applications - minimum, low, medium, full, emergency
Hit the dial on the other side resulting in various speed/throttle
positions - stop, coast, couple (1-2 mph), 4 mph, 7 mph, 10 mph, 15 mph
(we are not supposed to use 15 mph)
Ask some remote control trainmen how many times they looked at the box
after lacing an air hose or setting a brake and noticed that the box
had some sort of independent brake application, or the direction was
changed, or the speed selector had changed and the engine was starting
to move and the change to the controls was not intended. Then ask them
if they would have noticed that anything had changed in time to prevent
an injury or damage if they had not actually look down at the box in
time to notice what had happened. Their hearts will go into their
throats.
On a side note, some idiot reading this will be stubborn enough to
approach the carriers and the designers of the RCO equipment and tell
them that they can improve things and make remotes safer. I contend
that the only thing they are doing is building a better mousetrap, and
the employees are the mice. Again, it is all in the interest of saving
a buck. When was the last time your boss doubled your workload? Did it
make you more effective and your work easier? This is not a toy train
set. Would you give an air traffic controller with no flight experience
a crash course in avaition and remote control to fly a plane full of
passengers?
In the absence of a utility man or some other employee, when changing a
knuckle (all the while tethered to controls that could inadvertently be
operated, however unintentional and thus moving a locomotive which
should not be moved), whether the equipment is separated by 20 feet, 50
feet, or 500 feet is immaterial since rolling stock often moves quietly.
Wait and see, though. Because this is probably the nonsense that CSX
blows up your behind that contributed to the whole thing: he did not
have the required space between the equipment. They will also tell you
that remotes are about safety and not money. They will probably even
have the talking-head that is Michael Ward come out and say something,
because he is about the only company officer who is respected enough
and recognized by the general public and stockholders.
Perhaps the company will come out and say nothing at all, instead
choosing to sweep this one under the carpet. This is the course that
they appear to be taking, as the incident has not been discussed in any
way, shape or form on the Gateway or CSX.com. Mike Ward's weekly
message rambles on about how we can save him money by shutting down
locomotives to conserve fuel. I think there was also an announcement
this week about some bag of hot air flying up to NYC for a powwow with
Wall Street and the stockholders. Here's a big hint, how about having
him take a side trip to Selkirk to apologize? No. Instead we get no
acknowledgement, no discussion. No empathy, no compassion. My goodness,
even last month, when that CSX salesman went postal down in Maryland and
took out his family CSX had an announcement on its website. But now,
their corporate silence is golden. This silence and negligence is an
insult to the intelligence of CSX's employees, the general public, the
stockholders, and most of all, Jared's family, friends, and coworkers.
Knowing the kind of guy he was, Jared was the last person any of us
would have expected this to happen to.
CSX is an excellent example of the type of company that has helped
contribute to the current financial crisis our country is in. They
hemorrhage money left and right because they will not take common-sense
suggestions of people who genuinely want the company to succeed and can
see the potential that it has: its workers. It cuts their jobs,
implements questionable cost-cutting procedures under the guise of
safety, yet remains top-heavy with highly compensated fatcats. If
performance has been that poor, then perhaps the high salaries,
bonuses, stock options, company vehicles and expense accounts should go
right out the window. Maybe I am missing something, but do we REALLY
need an AVP of Locomotive Management AND an AVP of Locomotive
Distribution? Departments that have several people with the title of
Director?
As discussed above, the most likely scenario is that, after being
ordered to do so, in the futile attempt to change out a knuckle with
the box on, he inadvertently bumped some switches and levers on the box
which caused the engine to move, effectively coupling himself between
the equipment.
It is a sad day when a man dies because the company he works for is
REACTIVE instead of PROACTIVE. It is sadder still that his poor wife
and little girl will never see him alive again.
The fact remains that as long as that box is on, its control and
operation should be primary in order to ensure that both operator and
equipment are protected. Anything else, including riding equipment,
lacing airhoses, setting or releasing handbrakes, operating cutting
levers, and especially changing knuckles now renders operating that box
as secondary as the focus is elsewhere. But hey, CSX is doing this in
the interest of safety.
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